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Fortin: Why there Should be a Duty to Mitigate Liquidated Damages Clauses

NOTE
WHY THERE SHOULD BE A DUTY TO MITIGATE
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSES
I. INTRODUCTION

On May 15, 2008, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that there is no duty for non-breaching parties to mitigate damages in the
face of a liquidated damages clause.' In 2002, Paul Minihane entered
into a ten-year license agreement with NPS, LLC for two Club seats at
Gillette Stadium, the home of the New England Patriots football team.2
This agreement included a liquidated damages provision that allowed
NPS, LLC to accelerate the balance of monies owed under the contract
in the event of default. Despite attending all but one game in the 2002
season, Minihane paid only two payments under the agreement, and
NPS, LLC subsequently brought suit to enforce the acceleration clause.4
On appeal, the issues were confined to determining whether the
liquidated damages clause was valid and the amount of the damages
award.5 Although both parties briefed the issue of mitigation on the

1. NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Mass. 2008).
2. Id at 672. NPS, LLC is the developer of Gillette Stadium. Id.
3. Id. The acceleration clause read as follows:
"In the event that Licensee shall not have cured the default or breach..., Owner may
terminate the right of Licensee to the use and possession of the Club Seats and all other
rights and privileges of Licensee under the Agreement and declare the entire unpaid
balance of the License Fee (which for the purposes hereof shall include the total
aggregate unpaid balance of the annual License Fees for the remainder of the Term)
immediately due and payable, whereupon Owner shall have no further obligation of any
kind to Licensee. Owner shall have no duty to mitigate any damages incurred by it as a
result of a default by Licensee hereunder ... "
Id. at 672 n.2.
4. Id. at 672-73.
5. See Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670 (Mass.
2008) (No. SJC-10134) (statement of the issues solely references the enforceability of the liquidated
damages clause and the damages award); Brief for the Defendant-Appellee at 1, NPS, LLC v.
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assumption that non-breaching parties had such a duty,6 the Supreme
Judicial Court "held" that there is no duty to mitigate damages in the
face of a liquidated damages clause.
At first glance, this holding seems inequitable given the
circumstances of the case. First, the New England Patriots had just won
their first Superbowl championship in team history, and over 1.5
million fans attended the championship rally in Boston.9 Thus, there
seemed no lack of opportunity to mitigate by reselling the seats.'o
Additionally, as the duty to mitigate in the face of a liquidated damages
clause was not argued or briefed by the parties, the court was not attuned
to the repercussions and complications of issuing such a broad holding,
nor the great injustice the holding would cause to the traditional
understanding of mitigation doctrine. Rather, the court simply
"follow[ed] the rule in many other jurisdictions."" As a result, the
categorical rule dispensing with the duty to mitigate in the face of a
liquidated damages clause is faulty and underdeveloped in light of the
policies underlying the mitigation doctrine. These policies include
promoting efficiency, avoiding double profits, and avoiding penalty to
the defendant. 12 Contrary to decisions unconditionally dispensing with

Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670 (Mass. 2008) (No. SJC-10134) (statement of the issues solely references
the enforceability of the liquidated damages clause and the damages award).
6. Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 5, at 31, 33 (arguing that NPS, LLC had no
duty to mitigate as a lost volume seller and, even if it had a duty to mitigate, it made all reasonable
attempts to do so); Brief for the Defendant-Appellee, supra note 5, at 20-21 (arguing that NPS, LLC
had a duty to mitigate damages by attempting to resell the licenses and that it did mitigate its
damages by using the seats for good will).
7. NPS, LLC, 886 N.E.2d at 675. A "holding" is defined as "[a] court's determination of a
matter of law pivotal to its decision." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 749 (8th ed. 2004). Because the
relevancy of mitigation in the face of a liquidated damages clause was not raised on appeal, see
supra note 6 and accompanying text, and was thus not pivotal to the decision, it is unclear why the
Supreme Judicial Court would pronounce such a "holding."
8. Official New England Patriots, The History of the New England Patriots,
http://www.patriots.com/history/index.cfn?ac=History (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
9. Id.
10. In fact, NPS, LLC noted that it was doing 'everything [it] c[ould] to sell out the
stadium."' Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 5, at 33 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). NPS, LLC sent brochures to prospective licensees, maintained an interactive website, gave
facility tours to potential buyers, and hosted events with Patriots football players to attempt resale of
the licensed seats. Id. at 33-34. Despite such efforts, seats in the Club section did not sell out every
year. Id. at 34. NPS, LLC argued that, as a lost volume seller, damages could not be mitigated
because these seats remained available for sale. Id. at 31. Even though NPS, LLC, as a
commercially reasonable entity, was taking such actions anyway, the court's holding eliminates the
need to attempt any such efforts.
I1. NPS, LLC, 886 N.E.2d at 675.
12. See infra Part III.B-D.
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this duty, non-breaching parties generally should be required to mitigate
damages despite the enforcement of a liquidated damages clause,
especially when mitigation is simple and easy to calculate.' 3 After
detailing the purposes of liquidated damages and the mitigation doctrine
in Part II, Part III of this Note will explore the reasoning of those courts
opining that there is no duty to mitigate liquidated damages clauses. Part
III will then refute the rationale of these holdings by exploring the role
of mitigation in promoting economic efficiency and the avoidance of
waste, preventing double profits, avoiding penalties in contracts
damages, and the policy of good faith in contract enforcement and
performance. After discussing these common law and policy reasons
supporting the duty to mitigate in the case of some liquidated damages
clauses, Part IV will explore the applicability and validity of such a
holding in the context of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or the
"Code"). After considering some possible complications to this theory in
Part V, such as the complexity of modem commercial contracts, the
questionable duty to accept mitigation offers from the breaching party,
and the lost volume seller doctrine, this Note will ultimately conclude
that the courts have erred in categorically dispensing with the duty to
mitigate damages in the face of liquidated damages clauses.
Alternatively, courts should hold that non-breaching parties are required
to mitigate damages in the face of liquidated damages clauses, except
when mitigation would be particularly difficult to calculate.

13. Numerous scholars and commentators have noted that there is no duty to mitigate
damages in contract law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b (1981); STEVEN J.
BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE,
BREACH, ENFORCEMENT §5.3.2, at 175 (1995); CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 851 (5th ed. 2003); 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD
A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 64:27 (4th ed. 2002); E. Allan Farnsworth,
Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1184 (1970); Recent Case Note,
Damages-Mitigation by Injured Party on Breach of Contract, 34 YALE L.J. 553, 554 (1925)
[hereinafter Recent Case Note, Damages]. As non-breaching parties are not subject to legal action
or required to pay damages as a result of any failure to mitigate, mitigation can hardly be deemed a
duty. Rather, the mitigation doctrine simply precludes the non-breaching party from recovering
damages that could have been avoided by reasonable effort. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b.; BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra, §5.3.2, at 175; KNAPP ET AL., supra, at
851; 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra, §64:27; Farnsworth, supra, at 1184; Recent Case Note,
Damages, supra, at 554. However, because mitigation is an affirmative defense to be pled and
proved by the defendant, and requires set-off when damages have not been mitigated, it has been
argued that labeling mitigation a "duty" is both correct and consistent with usage. See MONROE H.
FREEDMAN, CONTRACTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LAWYERING 251 (2008). As the phrase "duty
to mitigate" is commonly used, it will also be used throughout this Note.
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II. BACKGROUND ON LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND MITIGATION THEORY
A. The Use and Purpose ofLiquidatedDamages Clauses
Liquidated damages clauses constitute agreements by the parties as
to the appropriate compensation for breach of contract and are awarded
in place of actual damages.14 Liquidated damages clauses are favored by
the courts when damages are "uncertain" in nature and there is no
market standard or other objective value to measure actual harm in the
event of breach.' 5 Valid liquidated damages clauses save both time and
expense at trial by preventing the need to litigate the actual damages
caused by the breach.' 6 The UCC, the model of commercial codes in
virtually every jurisdiction, requires that liquidated damages be
reasonable in light of anticipated or actual harm and that there be
difficulty in proving actual loss for such clauses to be enforceable. 7 The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (the "Restatement") also follows this
formulation.18
Thus, two elements must be evaluated in determining the validity of
liquidated damages provisions: the difficulty of proof of loss and the
reasonableness of the predetermined amount in relation to actual or
anticipated damages. However, the language of section 2-718(1) of the
UCC and the Restatement presents some difficulties in determining the

14.

See ISRAEL A. WASHBURNE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AS EXHIBITED IN SPECIAL

CONTRACTUAL RELATIONs 493 (2d ed. 1918) ("Liquidated damages are damages agreed upon by the

parties as and for compensation for, and in lieu of, the actual damages arising from a breach of
contract.").
15. Consol. Flour Mills Co. v. File Bros. Wholesale Co., 110 F.2d 926, 929-30 (10th Cir.
1940) (noting that the court will "look with candor, if not with favor, upon such
provisions... where the damages are uncertain in nature or amount, or are difficult of
ascertainment"); Art Country Squire, L.L.C. v. Inland Mortgage Corp., 745 N.E.2d 885, 891 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001) ("Generally, we look more favorably upon a liquidated damages provision where it
appears from all the evidence ... that the actual amount was uncertain or difficult to ascertain at the
time of execution of the agreement."); WASHBURNE, supra note 14, at 495 (noting liquidated
damages are favored when damages are "wholly uncertain").
16. See Susan V. Ferris, Note, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 862, 866 (1982).
17. Section 2-718(1) of the UCC reads:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an
amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the
breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2003); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-718(1) (West 1999)
(Massachusetts liquidated damages provision adopting the language of section 2-718(1) of the
UCC).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1).
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time at which reasonableness and difficulty of proof of loss are to be
evaluated. For example, if the liquidated damages amount is a
reasonable forecast of expected damages at the time of contracting, yet
no actual damages result from the breach, should the liquidated damages
clause be enforced? The language of the UCC indicates that, should the
amount set under the liquidated damages clause be reasonable from one
vantage point, but not the other, then the clause is valid.' 9 The
Restatement also appears to endorse this "either-or" proposition,
validating the liquidated damages provision if it is reasonable in light of
anticipated or actual harm. 20 However, the Restatement states that a noactual-harm defense can invalidate a liquidated damages clause because
loss and damages are not difficult to prove if no harm results from the

breach.2
Section 2-718(1) of the UCC and courts interpreting this provision
shed little light on the correct resolution of this anticipated versus actual
harm conundrum.22 Courts struggle to balance freedom of contract with
the inequity that would result if a party were able to recover the
liquidated damages amount in the event of no actual harm.23 Thus, the
precedential common law decisions of each state typically determine if
reasonableness and difficulty of proof of loss are to be evaluated at the
time of contracting or at the time of breach.24 Under Massachusetts
common law, a liquidated damages provision is enforceable if it is
reasonable in light of anticipated damages only.25 The refusal to take a
19. See U.C.C. §2-718(1); Ferris, supra note 16, at 872 (noting this result under the second
interpretation section 2-718(1) of the UCC). Thus, to be invalid, the liquidated damages clause must
be unreasonable both in light of anticipated and actual damages. Cf U.C.C. § 2-718(1); Ferris,
supra note 16, at 872. The first interpretation of UCC section 2-718(1) requires that the amount set
be reasonable in light of both anticipated damages and actual harm. See Ferris, supra note 16, at
871. However, this interpretation would require the expensive and time-consuming litigation that
such clauses were meant to avoid. Id. at 872.
20. Ferris, supra note 16, at 874 (noting this result under the Restatement).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b ("If, to take an extreme case, it
is clear that no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum as damages is
unenforceable."); see also Ferris, supra note 16, at 876.
22. See Ferris,supra note 16, at 873-74.
23. See TAL Fin. Corp. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (Mass. 2006); see
also Ferris,supra note 16, at 862 (noting the tension between freedom of contract and equity in
liquidated damage recovery).
24. Compare Kelly v. Marx, 705 N.E.2d 1114, 1115 (Mass. 1999) (holding the
reasonableness of damages and difficulty of proof of loss are evaluated at the time of contracting),
with Mattingly Bridge Co. v. Holloway & Son Constr. Co., 694 S.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Ky. 1985)
(holding that a liquidated damages clause that is unreasonable at the time of contracting or at the
time of breach is invalid).
25. TAL Fin. Corp., 844 N.E.2d at 1093; Kelly, 705 N.E.2d at 1115-16 & n.4 (expressly
rejecting the "second look" test and the no-actual-harm defense of the Restatement).
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"second look" at actual damages "most accurately matches the
expectations of the parties, who negotiated a liquidated damage[s]
amount that was fair to each side based on their unique concerns and
circumstances surrounding the agreement, and their individual estimate
of damages in event of a breach."26 Additionally, by limiting the inquiry
to reasonably anticipated damages, the litigation process is
unencumbered by the time and expense incurred in proving actual
damages. 27 Contrary to their stated rejection of the "second-look" test,
Massachusetts courts continue to state that the non-breaching party
cannot be awarded more than actual damages when damages are easily
ascertainable and the liquidated damages amount is "grossly
disproportionate to actual damages," or is "unconscionably excessive."28
Consequently, the UCC, Restatement, and common law all present
discordant positions on the proper interpretation and analysis of
liquidated damages provisions, including the right of breaching parties to
assert a no-actual-harm defense.
B. Understandingthe MitigationDoctrine
While the law concerning liquidated damages is inconsistent, no
such inconsistency exists in the general rule requiring non-breaching
parties to mitigate damages. Also known as the doctrine of avoidable
consequences, the mitigation doctrine simply states that "damages are
not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided
without undue risk, burden or humiliation." 2 9 The mitigation doctrine is
interpreted as imposing both negative and positive obligations on the

26. Kelly, 705 N.E.2d at 1117; see also TAL Fin. Corp., 844 N.E.2d at 1093. In addition, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland advanced an interesting argument akin to a "slippery slope" in
rejecting the no-actual-harm defense, asking: "[I]f we were to accept the no-actual-harm defense,
why would courts not then give greater damages than contemplated when the damages actually
exceeded the stipulated amount?" Barrie Sch. v. Patch, 933 A.2d 382, 393 (Md. 2007).
27. Kelly, 705 N.E.2d at 1117.
28. NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Mass. 2008) (citing A-Z Servicenter, Inc.
v. Segall, 138 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Mass. 1956)).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(l) (1981); see also BURTON &
ANDERSEN, supra note 13, § 5.3.2, at 175; KNAPP ET AL., supra note 13, at 851; WASHBURNE,

supra note 14, at 489; 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supranote 13, § 64:27; Recent Case Note, Damages,
supra note 13, at 554. Additionally, the Restatement incorporates the mitigation doctrine into its
"Measure of Damages in General" section. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347. The
injured party's "right to damages" is "less ... any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not
having to perform." Id. Theoretically, these damages are disallowed because they are viewed either
as being caused by the defendant or by the non-breaching party's intervening will rather than by the
plaintiff. See WASHBURNE, supra note 14, at 489; 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supranote 13, § 64:27.
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non-breaching party. 30 First, the non-breaching party must refrain from
any activities that increase the loss. 31 Second, a non-breaching party
must take affirmative actions to minimize loss. 3 2 The doctrine does not,
however, require the non-breaching party to be successful in this effort
to mitigate. The policy espoused by the doctrine is simply to encourage
a party to make "reasonable efforts" to minimize Ioss.3 4 Corbin notes:
His recovery against the defendant will be exactly the same whether he
makes the effort and mitigates his loss, or not; but if he fails to make
the reasonable effort, with the result that his injury is greater than it
would otherwise have been, he cannot recover judgment for the
amount of this avoidable and unnecessary increase. The law does not
penalize his inaction; it merely does nothing to compensate him for the
loss that he helped to cause by not avoiding it. 35
Not only does the doctrine emphasize merely effort and not
success, but a non-breaching party is solely required to make an effort
that is "reasonable" 36 and "appropriate in the circumstances."3 7 The nonbreaching party is not required to take steps that would be inconvenient,

30. See Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After MaterialBreach-Common Law
Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 553,
568 (1976).
31. Id. Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929), is perhaps the
most famous case forbidding acts that increase a non-breaching party's losses. Rockingham County,
after awarding a contract for the construction of a bridge to the plaintiff, decided not to construct the
road in which this bridge was to "be a mere connecting link." Id at 303. As this bridge was
effectively a "bridge to nowhere," the county cancelled the contract at the start of construction, little
work having been done at the time of cancellation. Id The plaintiff, however, continued to construct
the bridge and sued for damages nine months after the contract was cancelled. Id. The court held
that the non-breaching party has a "duty to do nothing to increase the damages flowing" from a
breach of contract and, thus, the plaintiff "had no right ... to pile up damages by proceeding with
the erection of a useless bridge." Id. at 307.
32. Hillman, supranote 30, at 568.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §350(2) ("The injured party is not precluded
from recovery by the rule stated in Subsection (1) to the extent that he has made reasonable but
unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss.").
34. Id. §350 cmt. h; 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 13, § 64:27. What constitutes
reasonable effort and undue risk or expense under section 350(2) of the Restatement "is a question
of fact." Id. Additionally, the non-breaching party is compensated for expenses garnered in the
attempt to mitigate. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. h.
35.

5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

§ 1039

(1964); see also Farnsworth,

supra note 13, at 1192 ("The principle of substitution ... applies only where an adequate substitute
contract could have been arranged by the injured party. Where no such transaction was possible, the
general measure of recovery applies.").
36. 5 CORBIN, supra note 35, § 1039.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b.
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burdensome, or expensive.38 Thus, mitigation places no greater burden
on a non-breaching party than to make a reasonable effort to minimize
loss, and a party who tries to do so, but fails, will recover the total
damages owed in each case.
III. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES/MITIGATION
CONUNDRUM-AND WHY THESE COURTS ARE WRONG

A. The Rationale of the Courts
Despite this relatively simple standard for complying with the
mitigation doctrine, many courts, including those relied on by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in deciding NPS, LLC v.
Minihane, have held that there is no duty to mitigate damages when the
contract contains a liquidated damages clause.39 However, the reasoning
of these cases is often scant and, in some cases, nonexistent. 40 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, explaining its reasoning more
fully than other courts, relied on freedom of contract principles and
noted that parties "exchange the opportunity to determine actual
damages after a breach, including possible mitigation, for the 'peace of
mind and certainty of result' afforded by a liquidated damages clause."4 1
Courts also justify their holdings by noting that mitigation is assessed by
the court, while liquidated damages are determined by the parties.4 2
Thus, courts find that the purpose of liquidated damages clauses is

38. Id. §350 cmt. g. For example, a person terminated from employment is not required under
the mitigation doctrine to take an inferior position, either in pay or stature, or a position different
from her previous position. See WASHBURNE, supra note 14, at 490.
39. See NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670, 675 & n.9 (Mass. 2008). The Massachusetts
court cited to the following cases to support its holding: Barrie Sch. v. Patch, 933 A.2d 382 (Md.
2007); Fed. Realty Ltd. P'ship v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., Inc., 735 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001); Lake Ridge Acad. v. Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183 (Ohio 1993); Cady v. IMC Mortgage Co.,
862 A.2d 202 (R.I. 2004). Id at 675 n.9, 676.
40. For example, a New York court simply found that damages are not reduced as a result of a
failure to mitigate because the liquidated damages clause is valid, without explaining the reasoning
for this result. Fed Realty Ltd. P'ship,735 N.Y.S.2d at 162. The Florida court shed slightly more
light on its decision, finding that there is no duty because damages were unknown at the time the
contract was formed and thus the liquidated damages clause was valid. Cady, 862 A.2d at 219.
However, the court did not explain why the uncertainty of damages necessitates the holding that
there is no duty to mitigate. See id.
41. NPS, LLC, 886 N.E.2d at 675 (quoting Kelly v. Marx, 705 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (1999)).
42. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1291 (7th Cir. 1985); BarrieSch.,
933 A.2d at 392.
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defeated if mitigation is required and the parties' determination of actual
damages is not upheld.43
Again, the negligible reasoning behind such broad holdings is
alarming, especially considering that the logic used is often faulty. For
example, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that "[a] valid liquidated
damages clause contemplates the nonbreaching party's inability to
identify and mitigate its damages."" A liquidated damages clause does
contemplate the inability to identify and calculate actual loss. 45
However, it does not follow that the parties contemplated the possibility
of successful mitigation in determining the liquidated damages amount,
as the doctrine simply requires a party to make a reasonable effort to
mitigate.46 In fact, the parties just as likely may have focused only on
actual loss, rather than loss avoided, in determining the amount due
under the liquidated damages clause. Additionally, good business sense
often dictates that the non-breaching party work to make up its loss,
even if it is entitled to damages.4 7
The Ohio court went on to state, "[i]f damages are 'uncertain as to
amount and difficult of proof,' as they must be, the nonbreacher cannot
be expected to reduce them after a breach."" This is perhaps the most
illogical statement of all. Even though the opportunity to mitigate is
uncertain at the time of contracting, opportunities may arise prior to and
after breach that could make mitigation simple, effortless, and profitable
for the non-breaching party. While some courts have held that there is a
duty to mitigate,49 the trend towards the opposite holding is alarming.o
Rather than relying solely on liquidated damages theory, the
decision to eliminate the general duty to mitigate damages should take

43. Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1291; BarrieSch., 933 A.2d at 392.
44. Lake Ridge Acad, 613 N.E.2d at 190.
45. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 34-3 5 and accompanying text.
47. As noted above, NPS, LLC was making every effort to resell the seats purchased by
Minihane. Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 5, at 33.
48. Lake Ridge Acad, 613 N.E.2d at 190.
49. See Watts Bldg. Corp. v. Schoel, Ogle, Benton, Gentle, & Centeno, 598 So. 2d 832, 83435 (Ala. 1992) (upholding rent acceleration clauses only when the duty to mitigate damages is
enforced); Aurora Bus. Park Assocs. v. Michael Albert, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Iowa 1996)
(rent acceleration clause was valid as it properly provided for landlord's duty to mitigate damages);
Arrowhead Sch. Dist. No. 75, Park County v. Klyap, 79 P.3d 250, 264 (Mont. 2003) (noting that
attempts to waive the general duty to mitigate damages can render a liquidated damages clause
unconscionable).
50. The holding that there is no duty to mitigate in the face of a liquidated damages clause is
beginning to be recognized as law in treatises and summaries of American law. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Damages §538 (2003); 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 13, §65:31.
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into consideration the purposes of both liquidated damages and
mitigation doctrine. Taking into account all dimensions of these contract
principles, courts should not promulgate categorical rules dispensing
with the duty to mitigate in the face of liquidated damages clauses.
Rather, the better rule is to enforce the traditional duty to mitigate
damages on all non-breaching parties, even if the parties have stipulated
to a liquidated damages provision in the contract, with exceptions to this
rule occurring on a case-by-case basis. This rule would best effectuate
the policies underlying the mitigation doctrine. First, mitigation of
liquidated damages can promote efficiency and the avoidance of
economic waste. Second, mitigating liquidated damages prevents the
non-breaching party from earning double profits. Third, mitigation
prevents penalizing the defendant for her breach and thus effects the
purposes of the law of damages by limiting the damages award to
compensation only. Fourth, the mitigation effort is consistent with
contractual good faith, an overarching principle of American contract
law. 5 1 Finally, a categorical rule upholding the duty to mitigate will
protect non-breaching parties' interests in the event the liquidated
damages clause is held to be invalid or constitute a penalty. In this case,
traditional damage calculations would apply and the damages award
could be reduced by any failures to mitigate.
B. The Avoidance of Waste and Promotion of Efficiency
One of the main purposes underlying the mitigation doctrine is the
avoidance of economic waste. 5 2 "'Economic waste"' occurs when a
party "use[s] ... assets in a way considered 'wasteful' according to

standards shared by society in general." 5 3 Mitigation prevents waste by
disallowing the non-breaching party from taking actions that increase its
damages.54 In Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., the court notes
that continuing to complete work on a bridge, despite the county's
cancellation of the contract due to its decision not to construct the road
that the bridge was built to connect, "inflict[s] damage on the defendant

51. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
52. See Hillman, supra note 30, at 558; see also Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35
F.2d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 1929).
53. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 1173.
54. See Clark v. Marsiglia, I Denio 317, 318 (N.Y. 1845) ("[T]he plaintiff had no right, by
obstinately persisting in the work, to make the penalty upon the defendant greater than it would
otherwise have been."); Hillman, supra note 30, at 568. Such waste, in turn, penalizes the defendant
by forcing her to compensate a greater loss than if the plaintiff had stopped in her work. See infra
Part Il.D.
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without benefit to the plaintiff . . .. The work may be useless to the

defendant, and yet he would be forced to pay the full contract price."5 5
Pursuing such work, despite knowledge that the contracting party no
longer desires such service, wastes not only the physical materials used
in construction or manufacture, but also the many hours of labor that
could have been put to better use pursuing other projects. 6 Holding that
there is no duty to mitigate forces a defendant to accept goods or
services that it does not want, thereby denying the market of such goods
or services where they may be in greater demand.5 7 In sale of goods
cases, there is likely to be another person in the free market who wants
and is willing to pay for such goods, encouraging sellers to mitigate their
damages by entering into substitute transactions.58
Closely tied to the theory of waste-avoidance is the idea that the
law abhors idleness. 5 9 This idea is expounded most clearly in Howard v.
Daly:
[A] person discharged from service must not remain idle, but must
accept employment elsewhere if offered .... The doctrine of
"constructive service" is not only at war with principle, but with the
rules of political economy, as it encourages idleness and gives
compensation to men who fold their arms and decline service, equal to
those who perform with willing hands their stipulated amount of
labor.... [N]o rule can be sound which gives him full wages while
60
living in voluntary idleness.

55. 35 F.2d at 307 (citation omitted).
56. See id. at 303 (noting that plaintiff claimed damages totaling $18,301.07 in labor and
materials, despite that such costs totaled only $1,900 at the time of contract breach).
57. See Clark, 1 Denio at 318-19; Hillman, supra note 30, at 558-59. This rationale for
mitigation is not applicable to the facts of the NPS, LLC v. Minihane case, as NPS, LLC was not
performing services for Minihane. See generally 886 N.E.2d 670 (Mass. 2008) (NPS, LLC had sold
a license for Club Seats to Minihane, and not personal services.). However, it is important to
mention this rationale, as this Note espouses a general directive to uphold a duty to mitigate in the
face of liquidated damages clauses across contract types.
58. See Famsworth, supra note 13, at 1188; Hillman, supra note 30, at 558-59. Indeed, the
seller is likely to have every incentive to do this anyway. Cf Michael B. Kelly, Living Without the
Avoidable Consequences Doctrine in Contract Remedies, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175, 182 (1996)
(noting as one example that a buyer, after a seller's breach, will still need to purchase substitute
goods to avoid consequential damages).
59. See Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362, 373 (1875); Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 1188
(citation omitted); Kelly, supranote 58, at 186.
60. 61 N.Y. at 373-74. "Constructive service" is the idea that the employee was ready and
willing to perform the contract at any time, and would have done so except for the breach and thus
the aggrieved party can recover wages as if service was actually provided. See id at 368-70.
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Mitigation thus prevents the "moral hazard" of idleness and inefficiency
by requiring that a plaintiff make a reasonable effort to minimize her
loss to receive her expectation interest on the contract." Without
mitigation, "some plaintiffs ... [would] allow avoidable losses to
mount," knowing that full damages would be recoverable in court.6 2
Such hazards do not disappear just because damages are specified
in a liquidated damages clause. For example, in NPS, LLC, the
"substantial benefit" of Club seats would remain unused throughout the
remainder of the ten-year license should NPS, LLC elect not to
mitigate.6 3 More likely, NPS, LLC would choose to resell the seats so as
to not waste this benefit, and in fact tried to do so. But, since mitigation
is "irrelevant" when there is a liquidated damages clause, NPS, LLC
would retain a "double profit."64 As many New England Patriots fans
would attest, allowing these seats to remain empty for nine straight years
would be using "assets in a way considered 'wasteful' according to
standards shared by society in general."'65 As previously noted, it is
likely that a member of the free market would recognize such a benefit
and be willing to purchase the licenses.6 6 However, if no such substitute
purchaser exists, the plaintiff still receives her full recovery if the
mitigation attempts fail.6 7 The broad holding that mitigation efforts are
irrelevant in the face of liquidated damages clauses denies the
opportunity for other consumers to benefit from the breach.
C. PreventingDouble Profits
It is common understanding that, in breach of contract cases,
general damages are "based on . .. expectation interest[s]."6 8 Not only
does mitigation prevent the non-breaching party from receiving "double

61. Kelly, supra note 58, at 186.
62. Id. Further, the damages award would also compensate the plaintiff for any incidental
costs of the mitigation effort. Id. at 186-87.
63. NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Mass. 2008).
64. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. As previously noted, NPS, LLC was trying
without success to enter into substitute license agreements. See supra note 10. However, it is
unknown if NPS, LLC was insisting that substitute agreements be for ten-year durations. Under
mitigation theory, it may or may not have been reasonable to insist on such lengthy contracts. NPS,
LLC may have been able to reasonably mitigate by entering into shorter contractual relationships.
65. Farnsworth, supranote 13, at 1173; see also supra notes 8-9, 53 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
67. 5 CORBIN, supranote 35, § 1039.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
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profits" as a result of breach, 69 but it also prevents the non-breaching
party from retaining any non-monetary benefits that result from the
breach.70
General contract damages dictate that a party is entitled to those
damages that represent its expectation interest: "Compensation is the
fundamental and all-pervasive principle governing the award of
damages. . . . 'In civil actions, the law awards to the party injured a just
indemnity for the wrong which has been done him, and no more . . . .'"n
Thus, damages in breach of contract cases aim to put the non-breaching
party "in as good a position [financially] as he would have been in had
the contract been performed." 72 If a party successfully mitigates its
damages, but is allowed to recover the same amount as if it did not
mitigate its damages (for example, by being awarded the full liquidated
damages amount), it is obtaining a greater benefit than it deserves under
strict compensation and may in fact be receiving "double profits."7 3 In
fact, if a plaintiff avoids any loss, "allowing recovery for the avoided
loss would leave her in a position better than the one she would have
occupied if the contract had been performed." 74 The general expectation
interest accounts for the avoidable consequences doctrine, as awarded
damages do not encompass the windfall or double profits that result
from successful mitigation.75
The mitigation doctrine is in accord with the general expectation
interest even if mitigation efforts are not successful.76 Superficially, the
mitigation doctrine appears to be at odds with the expectation interest by
denying the plaintiff full recovery if no reasonable mitigation attempts
69. See FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 250; Recent Case Note, Damages, supra note 13, at
554.
70. See Kelly, supra note 58, at 190. The non-breaching party can retain non-monetary
benefits after breach that are not deducted when determining defendant's liability. See id. at 190-91.
For example, NPS, LLC gained the non-monetary benefit of using the Club seats to entertain VIPs,
charities, and employees to promote goodwill in the community and workplace, and yet this was not
taken into account in the damages award. Brief for the Defendant-Appellee, supra note 5, at 21.
71. WASHBURNE, supra note 14, at 456-57 (citing Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211, 220 (1873)
(emphasis added)).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a; see also Kelly, supra note 58, at
176-77.
73. See Kelly, supra note 58, at 184. Chief Justice Bell, dissenting in BarrieSchool v. Patch,
noted that awarding the full liquidated damages amount without regard to mitigation "would result
in a windfall..., i.e., the School would be doubly compensated." 933 A.2d 382, 401 (Md. 2007);
see also Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 418 (1947) ("[O]ne man's default
should not lead to another man's unjust enrichment.").
74. See Kelly, supranote 58, at 184.
75. Id. at 187; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 249.
76. Kelly, supranote 58, at 185.
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are taken." However, Professor Michael B. Kelly argues that the
mitigation doctrine is in line with the expectation interest when one
considers the benefits that are retained by the breaching party after the
breach. For example, sellers of goods retain their goods, which not
only can be resold, but have a monetary value in and of themselves.79
NPS, LLC retained the "substantial benefit" of having the seats available
when Minihane breached his contract.80 Not only was NPS, LLC trying
to resell the seats,81 but, while this effort was ongoing, the seats were
used by "VIP's, charities, families of players and employees and this
provide[d] value to the New England Patriots."82 Professor Kelly notes:
The law attributes the market price to the seller not because she could
have realized that value by reasonable efforts to sell the goods, but
because she did realize that value by retaining the goods. The goods
are valuable; retaining them is a benefit. The plaintiff, thus, has
received an actual benefit from the breach, not merely an opportunity
to reduce the loss. The expectation interest requires an offset for the
value of that benefit.83
Thus, mitigation is required to fulfill the expectation interest of contract
damages law and to prevent double profits, whether the effort is
successful or not.
D. PreventingPenalty
Allowing the non-breaching party to retain double profits, or
benefits above and beyond its expectancy interest, correspondingly
penalizes the breaching party by requiring payment greater than that
required for compensation.84 In Clark v. Marsiglia, the court noted that
the plaintiff would "make the penalty upon the defendant greater than it
would otherwise have been" by not mitigating damages. Chief Justice

77. Id. at 185, 187.
78. Id. at 187.
79. See id at 188. Additionally, one retains her time in the event of breach of a service
contract. Id.
80. See NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Mass. 2008).
81. Brief ofthe Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 5, at 33.
82. Brief for the Defendant-Appellee, supra note 5, at 21.
83. Kelly, supra note 58, at 190. Professor Kelly ultimately concludes that "we can live
without the avoidable consequences doctrine" if courts correctly conceptualize expectancy damages
by accounting for the benefits retained by a breach. Id. at 289.
84. See FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 249; see also supra note 54, infra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.
85. 1 Denio 317, 318 (N.Y. 1845).
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Bell, in his dissent in Barrie School v. Patch, noted that contracts law
does not aim to penalize the breaching party: "It is a long-held, and wellsettled, general principle of contract law that contract remedies are to be
compensatory, not punitive.... Liquidated damages provisions are not
immune to this general rule."86 Thus, mitigation enforces the expectation
interest by disallowing the non-breaching party from gaining more than
he has lost as a result of the breach and by forbidding the breaching
party to lose more in the payment of damages than he has gained after
breach.
The very purposes of contract damages law are defeated by courts
that hold that mitigation does not apply if there is a liquidated damages
clause.88 That the parties have specified in advance the amount of
damages appropriate in the event of a breach does not mean that the nonbreaching party does not retain benefits. While the freedom of contract
principle is one reason to uphold the validity of liquidated damages
clauses,89 freedom of contract also encompasses "[t]he legal right of
either party to violate, abandon, or renounce his contract, on the usual
terms of compensation to the other for the damages which the law
recognizes and allows ....90 While parties have the freedom to

86. 933 A.2d 382, 395 (Md. 2007).
87. The Florida District Court of Appeal recognized that double profit/penalty issues would
arise should the court not require mitigation in the face of liquidated damages clauses in situations
similar to Barrie School: "[W]here the school actually fills the place of the absent student, the
school's damages will be mitigated to the extent of the new student's payments. To conclude
otherwise would create a dual recovery for the school and a penalty to the parent . . . ." Perez v.
Aerospace Acad., Inc., 546 So. 2d 1139, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Similar to the reasoning of
Chief Justice Bell in his dissent in Barrie School, discussed infra note 88, the court reasoned that,
insofar as mitigation was not taken into account, the liquidated damages clause was a penalty, and
the case was remanded for a determination of this issue. Id.
88. Barrie Sch., 933 A.2d at 395 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) ("I am troubled by the result reached
by the Majority, as it undermines basic principles of contract law pertaining to the equity and
reasonableness of contract remedies."). Chief Justice Bell, in arguing that mitigation should factor
into the court's award of damages in the face of liquidated damages clauses, took a slightly different
view than that espoused in this Note. Rather than determining the validity of a liquidated damages
clause and then applying mitigation principles, Chief Justice Bell proposes that mitigation is a factor
to be considered in determining the validity of the liquidated damages clause itself:
Thus, viewing a liquidated damages provision in retrospect, the non-breaching party's
failure to mitigate renders the clause a penalty and, thus, invalid. The clause is likewise
invalid where the non-breaching party's damages, in effect, have been-because not
excessive, or exorbitant-mitigated ....
... [W]here the non-breaching party ... has taken steps that mitigated the damages, that
fact must be taken into account.
Id. at 404.
89. See Ferris,supranote 16, at 863.
90. Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301, 308 (4th Cir. 1929).
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stipulate liquidated damages, there is a corresponding freedom to break
such a contract, and the measure of damages must be consistent with the
expectation interest.9 1 The damages award, then, must be adjusted
accordingly to ensure that the aggrieved party is receiving compensation
only, and not more than the expectation: "Liquidated damages
provisions are based on the principle of just compensation and may not
be used to reap a windfall or to secure performance by the compulsion of
disproportion., 92 It is good business sense (and common sense) to think
that an aggrieved party will attempt to resell goods that have been
repudiated in the contract or otherwise seek to capitalize on any benefits
that were retained. 93 Where a party will take such actions in pursuance of
greater profits, the law should take these actions into account when
determining damages, even if the liquidated damages clause is valid.
Admittedly, holding that there is no duty to mitigate is more
efficient in the sense that the court will have little to no work to do in
calculating damages. However, courts must do equity and justice, and
such ends are not achieved by dispensing with the need to mitigate
damages in the face of every liquidated damages clause. It has long been
established that "' [e]quity abhors forfeitures."' 9 4 In high value contracts,
disregarding the duty to mitigate when it would be easy to calculate
damages would subsequently require the defendant to incur the penalty
and may amount to a forfeiture of a substantial amount of money.
Surely, requiring reasonable attempts to prevent such a loss to the
defendant is not a heavy burden for the non-breaching party to bear. For
example, the result would certainly be unjust if NPS, LLC was able to
resell the license in its entirety and Minihane remained obliged to forfeit
$65,500, the remaining value of the license. 95
E. The Good FaithRequirement in ContractEnforcement
Good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of
contracts is a fundamental concept of American contract law.96 The
doctrine of avoidable consequences "is at [the] heart" of "good faith

91. See WASHBURNE, supra note 14, at 456-57.
92. JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 468 (4th Cir. 2001).
93. Kelly, supra note 58, at 226-27 & n.148.
94. FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 74.
95. NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670, 676 (Mass. 2008).
96. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 13, § 1.1, at 2 (noting that "almost all U.S.
jurisdictions" require good faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts). The idea of good
faith is overwhelmingly recognized, and has found statutory recognition in the adoption of the UCC
in 1954. Id. at 164.
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enforcement."97 Courts for many centuries refused to find against the
express contract because of the nebulous and vague definition of good
faith. However, courts have long recognized that "to persist in
accumulating a larger demand is not consistent with good faith ... ."
Efforts to minimize losses evince good faith even if the parties have
laid out a reasonable estimate of the damages that may result from
breach. As Professors Steven J. Burton and Eric G. Andersen note,
"[r]egardless of the source,... the principles of good faith govern
enforcement rights." 10 0 These professors explicitly state that:
The same principle applies when enforcement is by means of an agreed
term, rather than common law damages. The enforcing party is held
accountable for taking reasonable steps that would reduce the costs of
the remedy. Accordingly, one may not invoke an enforcement term if
he could have taken reasonable measures, not prejudicial to his own
position, to eliminate or reduce the risk to the performance interest the
term was designed to protect.o10
It is thus clear that, whether or not the amount of actual damages was
predetermined in a liquidated damages clause, it promotes good faith
and fair dealing to take reasonable attempts to minimize the amount
owed by the defendant.' 02
Additionally, requiring a duty to mitigate liquidated damages
protects the integrity of contracts in the marketplace. Scholars note that
if society had a great interest in compelling contract performance,
penalties such as criminal or civil sanctions, or the award of punitive
damages, would constitute the remedy for breach of contract. 0 3
Professor E. Allan Farnsworth notes that "a society that depends so

97. Id. at 164 n.2.
98.

See KEvIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF

CONTRACT 307 (Paul L. Murphy ed., 1990). Courts in the distant past only recognized defenses
such as fraud and duress because "[v]ague abstractions like good faith were adverse to predictability
and the security of the transaction." Id. Good faith, while still rather imprecise, can be
conceptualized as follows: "Once the contract is formed or reasonable expectations are raised, the
parties trust that their defenses may be lowered on the faith of an implied agreement to act honestly
and faithfully in carrying out their common purpose." Id. at 306.
99. Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317, 319 (N.Y. 1845); see also TEEVEN, supranote 98, at 309
("[A] knowing failure to mitigate damages was found to violate good faith.").
100. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 13, § 5.2.2, at 169.
101. Id.at286.
102. See id. at 175.
103. See Farnsworth,supranote 13, at 1145-46; Hillman, supra note 30, at 556.
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heavily on private bargains has itself a stake in how bargains fare."l 0 4
Thus, contract law aims to "salvage the transaction" and "avoid
unnecessary waste" by imposing the duty to mitigate damages. 0 5
However, such "salvaging" cannot occur if no duty to mitigate is
required in the face of a liquidated damages clause. While it can hardly
be said that holding that there is no duty to mitigate will deter people
from entering contracts, it is in accord with the policies underlying
damages law and contractual good faith to require parties to "salvage" a
transaction.
F. Consistency in Damages Calculations-TheDifference Between
Expected Loss andActual Damages
Requiring non-breaching parties to mitigate damages in the face of
liquidated damages clauses does not contradict the purpose of such
provisions. The rule eradicating the duty to mitigate liquidated damages
does not recognize that, at common law, mitigation is factored into the
damages awarded to the non-breaching party.10 6 Actual damages
constitute "[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a
proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses."1 o Actual
damages represent the loss on the bargain caused by the breach and are
calculated by determining the loss in value minus the cost avoided, plus
other loss. 0 8 The Restatement dictates that the amount mitigated by the
non-breaching party is "simply subtracted from the amount that would
otherwise have been recoverable as damages" to determine awarded
damages.109 Thus, absent a liquidated damages clause, damages are
calculated in three steps: First, the court must determine the losses
caused by the breach (including both loss in value and other loss);
second, the amount that was, or could have been, mitigated must be
determined by the court; third, the amount mitigated is subtracted from

104. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 1183; see also Hillman, supra note 30, at 556 ("By
encouraging contract formation, society is benefited by the specialization and efficiencies which
result from the contract arrangement.").
105. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 1183.
106. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
107.

108.
loss").
109.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 416 (8th ed. 2004).

Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 1162 ("Damages = loss in value - cost avoided + other
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 350

cmt. b (1981); see KNAPP ET AL., supra

note 13, at 848 ("These savings are to be deducted from the aggregate loss suffered in order to
compute the plaintiff's net recovery.").
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the amount of loss to determine actual damages."10 This method of
calculating damages accords with the aims of damages law."
The method of calculating loss delineated above is equally
applicable in the face of a liquidated damages clause. Courts and
scholars consistently conceptualize liquidated damages as a substitute
for actual damages.1 12 However, if a liquidated damages clause is a
reasonable estimate of anticipated or actual damages and thus seeks to
"repay actual losses,"'' 3 this formulation does not include any "harm
avoided" after the breach and, as such, may overcompensate the nonbreaching party.114 As a substitute for actual damages, the liquidated
damages amount represents only step one in the formula above."s if
there was mitigation, or a reasonable opportunity to mitigate, the court
should go on to determine the mitigation amount and subtract this
amount from that due under the liquidated damages provision, especially
where such calculations are simple. 16 Upholding liquidated damages
clauses allows the courts to save time and expense by forgoing litigation

110. See Hollwedel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 188 N.E. 266, 268 (N.Y. 1933) (asserting that the
wages payable for the remainder of the contract constitutes only the "prima facie" measure of
damages, but awarded damages must account for income that the terminated employee "has earned,
will earn, or could with reasonable diligence earn during the unexpired term"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b; KNAPP ET AL., supra note 13, at 848.

111. See supranotes 71-75 and accompanying text.
112. NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670, 674 n.6, 675 n.9 (Mass. 2008); Barrie Sch. v.
Patch, 933 A.2d 382, 392 (Md. 2007); WASHBURNE, supra note 14, at 493. But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (noting that liquidated damages determine the amount
"payable" in case of breach). However, this formulation of liquidated damages as amount payable is
conditional-such clauses only represent the amount payable "as long as the provision does not
disregard the principle of compensation." Id.
113.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 416 (8th ed. 2004).

114. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
115. Some courts state that liquidated damages function to replace step three in the above
formulation. See Barrie Sch., 933 A.2d at 392. However, this court repeatedly confused actual and
awarded damages. The court noted that liquidated damages are a substitute for actual loss, but did
not differentiate actual and awarded damages. Id. The court simply stated that inquiry need not
occur as to actual damages, and that this "includes a determination of whether the parties attempted
to mitigate damages.. . ." Id.; see also Lake Ridge Acad. v. Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183, 190 (Ohio
1993) (noting that "[a] ... liquidated damages clause contemplates the nonbreaching party's
inability to identify and mitigate its damages"). The Ohio court posited that a liquidated damages
clause substituted for payable damages, making "proof of.. . actual loss (including what he earned
or might have earned on another job) .. . no longer relevant." Id. at 190.
116. As stated in the Introduction, this Note argues only that courts should not adopt a general
rule dispensing with the duty to mitigate in the face of a valid liquidated damages clause. If
damages are extremely complex, requiring mitigation in all circumstances would defeat the
purposes of entering into a liquidated damages clause by increasing the time and money spent on
litigating damages. See infra Part V.A.
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regarding loss in value and other loss." 7 Because the liquidated damages
clause does not require proof regarding step one, the time and expense of
litigating this first issue is avoided despite having a duty to mitigate." 8
Additionally, as parties are under no duty to wait for the non-breaching
party to attempt mitigation prior to bringing suit,"9 the amount of time
assessed in mitigation litigation may not necessarily be burdensome. If
the attempt to mitigate is unsuccessful, the aggrieved party will receive
the full liquidated damages amount.120 Therefore, requiring a duty to
mitigate does not add complicated calculations when mitigation is
unsuccessful.
Furthermore, where liquidated damages clauses represent
accelerated payment, substitute transactions may allow the court to
drastically reduce all calculations: "Where the principle of substitution
applies, it has the major consequence of relieving the court of much of
the burden of calculating loss.',12t For example, in NPS, LLC, if a buyer
offered to purchase the remaining nine years of the license for the same
contract price, then clearly the damages calculation would equal only
Minihane's missed payments, plus any fees expended by NPS in
entering the substitute transaction.12 2 Similarly, if the company was able
to re-sell a license for only one year, it is clear that it would not require
tremendous litigation to subtract one year from the total loss. In fact, the
simplicity of calculating damages in such cases should invalidate a
liquidated damages clause because liquidated damages clauses are only
appropriate where damages are difficult to calculate.123
G. A Safeguard in the Event ofPenalty or Invalidity
Lastly, a categorical rule dispensing with the duty to mitigate
damages in the face of a liquidated damages clause can jeopardize the
damages award for those non-breaching parties relying on the rule if the
clause is deemed invalid and is severed from the contract. Alternatively,

117. See Kelly v. Marx, 705 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Mass. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a; Ferris, supra note 16, at 866.
118. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 13, § 7.3.3.2, at 315; WASHBURNE, supra note 14,
at 493 n.29.
119. See 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 608 (1999) ("[W]here one party to a contract breaches it, the
other party may immediately bring suit . . . .").
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(2); Id. § 350 cmts. a, h.
121. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 1198.
122. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying notes 11516.
123. See supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text.
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holding that there is a duty to mitigate damages safeguards the nonbreaching party in the event that the party does not mitigate damages and
traditional contract damages principles are applied.12 4 Although courts
tend to favor the aggrieved party's desires in construing liquidated
damages clauses,12 5 the party wishing to set aside the provision has
many arguments at its disposal to prove the clause invalid.12 6 First, the
liquidated damages clause may stipulate an amount that is unreasonable
in light of anticipated damages.12 7 Second, the liquidated damages clause
may be unreasonable in light of actual damages.12 8 Third, damages may
not have been difficult to calculate at the time of contracting or at the

124. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The
parties did not contract explicitly with reference to the measure of damages if the agreed-on damage
formula was invalidated, but all this means is that the victim of the breach is entitled to his common
law damages." (emphasis added)). The court expressly intended such calculations to include
mitigation: "In this case [common law damages] would be the unpaid contract price. .. minus the
costs ... saved by not having to complete the contract. . . ." See id; Barrie Sch. v. Patch, 933 A.2d
382, 402 (Md. 2007) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (noting that when a liquidated damages clause is
invalid, "[tihat simply means that the School will have to prove its actual damages as it would in
any breach of contract action and will be required, moreover, to mitigate its damages . . . ."); see
also U.C.C. §2-719 cmt. 1 (2003) ("[A]ny clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial
provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion and in that event the
remedies made available by this Article are applicable as if the stricken clause had never existed.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (noting that remedies for breach of contract
are determined by the "rules stated in this Chapter" when a liquidated damages clause is deemed
invalid, including the doctrine of avoidability).
125. TAL Fin. Corp. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1085, 1092 (Mass. 2006) (following
the majority of courts in deciding that doubts as to the validity of the liquidated damages clause are
resolved in favor of the non-breaching party). But see Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1290 ("Illinois
courts resolve doubtful cases in favor of classification as a penalty . . . .").
126. TAL Fin. Corp., 844 N.E.2d at 1087, 1092 (holding that the burden of proof rests with the
party seeking to set the provision aside). It is also important to note here that common law rules for
invalidating liquidated damages clauses may vary by jurisdiction. Compare Kelly v. Marx, 705
N.E.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Mass. 1999) (holding that a "second look" at the actual damages arising
from breach is not appropriate in evaluating the validity of a liquidated damages clause), with
X.L.O. Concrete Corp. v. John T. Brady & Co., 482 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(holding that a liquidated damages clause is not valid if grossly disproportionate to actual injury),
affd, 489 N.E.2d 768 (N.Y. 1985). This Note intends only to provide an overview of conflicting
holdings, rather than a comprehensive analysis by jurisdiction.
127. See TAL Fin. Corp., 844 N.E.2d at 1093-94 (noting that although Massachusetts does not
espouse taking a "'second look' at actual damages, a great disparity between actual harm and the
liquidated damages clause known at the time of contracting is construed as an unenforceable
penalty). The court noted that "[flailing to provide any recognition for the type, or timing, of the
default, while by no means determinative, tends to indicate that the provision's intended purpose
was not to estimate the different types of damages that might arise from a future default, but to
penalize for any failure, however immaterial." Id. at 1093.
128. See RKR Motors, Inc. v. Associated Unif. Rental & Linen Supply, Inc., 995 So. 2d 588,
595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a liquidated damages clause must bear some reasonable
relationship to the actual injury caused by the breach to be enforceable).
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time of the breach. 129 Finally, a liquidated damages clause may be
deemed unconscionable and struck from the contract.' 30 While courts
traditionally prefer to promote freedom of contract principles by
enforcing the parties' express contract, "[t]here is no bright line
separating an agreement to pay a reasonable measure of damages from
an unenforceable penalty clause." 3 '
In the event that such arguments prove successful and a liquidated
damages clause is severed from the contract, the court will use
traditional contract principles, including mitigation, to determine the
damages award.132 If the non-breaching party makes no attempt to
mitigate damages in reliance on the rule that mitigation is irrelevant in
the face of a liquidated damages clause, it may find its damages reduced
by any loss that could have been avoided through reasonable mitigation
attempts.' 3 3 On the other hand, upholding a general duty to mitigate will
encourage a party to make active attempts to mitigate damages in all
cases. To the extent that the mitigation effort is successful and the
amount is easily calculable, the liquidated damages award, or the
expectancy damages if the liquidated damages clause is severed, will be
reduced accordingly. If mitigation attempts are not successful, the nonbreaching party will be awarded the full liquidated damages or,
alternatively, its full expectancy damages if the liquidated damages
clause is deemed invalid. Courts should therefore not promulgate broad
rules dispensing with the obligation to mitigate, as the non-breaching
party may be penalized for any inactivity resulting from reliance on the
rule if the liquidated damages clause is deemed invalid.
In light of the aims of mitigation theory, courts should not dispense
with the duty to mitigate in the face of liquidated damages clauses.
However, as will be seen in Part V, complex contracts and difficult
factual situations may unduly complicate the calculation of actual
damages, thereby thwarting the efforts of the parties to avoid such

129. See Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1289-90 ("If damages would be easy to determine
then ... it is a penalty.").

130. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(holding that contracts are unconscionable where one party lacks a meaningful choice, and the
contract unreasonably favors the other party); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83-84 (3d
Cir. 1948) (finding that the contract as a whole is unconscionable because it "drives too hard a
bargain"); see also U.C.C. §2-718(1) (2003) ("A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is void as a penalty."); id. §2-302 cmt. 1 (noting that the provision allows the court to
sever unconscionable clauses to prevent "oppression and unfair surprise").
131. TAL Fin. Corp., 844 N.E.2d at 1093.
132. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 29, 33-34 and accompanying text.
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complex and expensive litigation. In such situations, courts should
determine that, given the circumstances of the case, mitigation is not
required in order to uphold the intent of the parties.
IV. MITIGATION AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES UNDER THE UCC

Although this Note has primarily explored the common law
concepts of mitigation and liquidated damages, almost all states have
enacted the UCC.134 These enactments create statutory duties for those
entering commercial contracts.' 35 Although the UCC does not expressly
codify a duty to mitigate in the face of a liquidated damages clause, such
a result is suggested given the numerous provisions encompassing
general mitigation principles and good faith in the UCC.
A. The Emphasis on Minimization ofDamages in the UCC
Several sections of the UCC deny recovery to those non-breaching
parties that do not attempt to minimize their losses.' 36 First, section 2712(1) of the UCC provides that a buyer of goods may purchase
substitute goods as a result of the seller's breach. 3 7 However, damages
are limited to "the difference between the cost of cover and the contract
price together with any incidental or consequential damages ... but less
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.""'3 This provision
expressly denies both expenses saved (in essence, mitigated) and losses
avoided by limiting recovery to the difference of cover and contract
price.139 Additionally, consequential damages only encompass losses

134. The UCC was first available to the public in 1952. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction
to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Some Observations on the Past, Present, and
Future of the U. C.C., 41 BUs. LAW. 1343, 1345 (1986). Currently, the UCC has been enacted with
some variation in all states except Louisiana and the District of Columbia. Id. at 1344 n.3. Although
the major purposes of the UCC were to update the commercial law and provide national uniformity,
such uniformity has been seriously undermined by the large number of legislative amendments
made by each state in enacting the Code. Id. at 1346; U.C.C. § 1-103(a). This Note will explore the
UCC as written by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute, rather than any particular state's adaptation of the Code. See Mooney,
supra, at 1344.
135. It appears that the UCC may only apply in those cases where the parties argue that such
statutes apply. See TAL Fin. Corp., 844 N.E.2d at 1092 (deciding that case law governed when the
parties did not alert the trial judge to applicable UCC provisions).
136. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
137. U.C.C. § 2-712(1).
138. Id. § 2-712(2); see also Hillman, supra note 30, at 580.
139. U.C.C. § 2-712(2). However, it should be noted that the UCC appears to contradict itself
as to whether such damages that could have been avoided are recoverable. Despite the language in
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that could not reasonably be mitigated.14 0 When a buyer breaches the
contract, the UCC requires an aggrieved seller to exercise reasonable
commercial judgment in deciding whether to complete purchased goods:
Where the goods are unfinished an aggrieved seller may in the exercise
of reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss
and of effective realization either complete the manufacture and
wholly identify the goods to the contract or cease manufacture and
resell for scrap or salvage value or proceed in any other reasonable
manner. 141
Section 2-709 of the UCC provides:
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller
may recover ... the price ... of goods identified to the contract if the
seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable

price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be
unavailing. (2) Where the seller sues for the price .. . [t]he net
proceeds of any such resale must be credited to the buyer and payment
of the judgment entitles him to any goods not resold.14
Thus, section 2-709 mandates that the seller attempt mitigation to
recover damages.1 43 Section 2-718(2) of the UCC notes that a buyer is
entitled to restitution when a seller does not deliver goods because of a
buyer's breach, but this right is "subject to offset to the extent that the
seller establishes . .. the amount or value of any benefits received by the
buyer directly or indirectly by reason of the contract." 4 4 Additionally,
"if the seller has notice of the buyer's breach before reselling goods
received in part performance, his resale is subject to the conditions laid
down in this Article on resale by an aggrieved seller (Section 2-706)"
and requires resale in a commercially reasonable manner. 145 The UCC

section 2-712(2), section 2-712(3) explicitly states any additional remedies are not barred to those
buyers that do not cover. Id. § 2-712(3).
140. Id. §2-715(2)(a) ("Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include .. .any loss ... which could not reasonably be prevented by cover. . . .").
141. Id § 2-704(2) (emphasis added); see also Hillman, supra note 30, at 580.
142. U.C.C. § 2-709(1)-(2) (emphasis added); see also Hillman, supra note 30, at 580.
143. See U.C.C. § 2-709(l)(b).
144. Id. § 2-718(2)-(3).
145. Id § 2-718(4). The language of section 2-706(1) is analogous to that of section 2-712 and
reads:
Where the resale is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the
seller may recover the difference between the resale price and the contract price together
with any incidental damages allowed under the provisions of this Article ... but less
expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
Id. §2-706(l).
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thus provides ample incentives to mitigate damages, as numerous
provisions deny the non-breaching party recovery of losses that could
have been avoided with reasonable effort.
Lastly, the duty to mitigate damages in the face of a liquidated
damages clause may be inferred from the UCC provision outlining the
Code's general remedies theory. Section 1-305(a) of the UCC provides:
The remedies provided by [the Uniform Commercial Code] must be
liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in
as good a position as if the other party had fully performed but neither
consequential or special damages nor penal damages may be had
except as specificall 4rrovided in [the Uniform Commercial Code] or
by other rule of law.
This provision captures the traditional theory of contract damages
and provides only for the non-breaching party's expectancy interests. 147
As noted above, such expectancy interests encompass mitigation, as any
losses that the non-breaching party does not avoid become an added
benefit that would not have accrued had the contract been fulfilled.148
The Official Comment also states that this section of the UCC "makes it
clear that damages must be minimized."l 49 The recognition of the
mitigation doctrine, implied by the above language stressing
compensation in damages awards, would thus be properly applied to
liquidated damages provisions under the UCC.
B. The Importanceof Good Faith and the Common Law in the UCC
The UCC's emphasis on good faith further supports a rule
obligating mitigation of damages despite a liquidated damages clause.
Section 1-304 of the UCC expressly requires that merchants employ
good faith in both contract performance and enforcement.15 0
Additionally, while the UCC provides that parties can vary their rights
and duties by agreement, the "obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness, and care.. . may not be disclaimed by agreement."' 5 '
146. Id. § 1-305(a) (alteration in original).
147. See supranotes 68-72 and accompanying text.
148. See supra Part H1I.C.

149. U.C.C. § 1-305 cmt. 1.
150. Id. § 1-304 ("Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement." (alteration in original)).
151. Id. § 1-302(a)-(b). Although section 1-302 disallows such obligations from being written
out of any contract, it notes that contracts can specify the "standards by which the performance of
those obligations [are] to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable." Id § I302(b). Admittedly, a liquidated damages clause that specifies awarded damages and explicitly
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As noted previously, good faith is violated when the non-breaching party
makes no effort to mitigate damages.15 2 To emphasize the inseparability
of mitigation and good faith, the Code reiterates in numerous sections
that the non-breaching party should attempt the mitigation of losses in
good faith. 153 For example, section 2-706 requires that a seller must
resell goods "in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner"
after a buyer's breach.154 Section 2-712(1) provides that a buyer may
"'cover,"' but only if such cover is made "in good faith and without
unreasonable delay ... .."s In accordance with the discussion in Part
III.E, the UCC's good faith requirement indicates that mitigation should
be required in the face of a liquidated damages clause.
Furthermore, the UCC states that the "principles of law and equity"
supplement the Code provisions.' 56 The Official Comment recognizes
that the UCC "was drafted against the backdrop of existing bodies of
law, including the common law and equity, and relies on those bodies of
law to supplement its provisions . ... "

It also clarifies that the

common law will be preempted when there is a UCC provision on point,
or where there is a conflicting UCC policy.15 8 As the UCC promotes a
policy of mitigation,' 59 and its provisions do not explicitly provide
otherwise, mitigation in the face of a liquidated damages clause is not
preempted by the UCC. Consequently, mitigation, an established
common law principle and a recognized embodiment of good faith,
should be considered when determining damages under commercial
contracts that include liquidated damages clauses.16 0
To summarize, the UCC expressly anticipates the mitigation of
damages in a number of provisions governing the damages awarded in
case of breach. The UCC also emphasizes good faith in both contract

excludes a duty to mitigate may be viewed as the "standard" for which good faith in enforcement
may be measured, assuming arguendo that such a clause would not be construed as unconscionable.
However, as commercial reasonableness often indicates that mitigation is desirable and parties may
have an expectation that the non-breaching party will attempt to mitigate losses, good faith is best
effected by requiring mitigation, rather than assuming that the parties intended to vary the
traditional conceptions of good faith in contract enforcement.
152. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
154. U.C.C. §2-706(1); see also Hillman, supranote 30, at 580.

155. U.C.C. § 2-712(1).
156. Id. § 1-103(b).
157.

Id. § 1-103 cmt. 2.

158. Id.
159. See supra Part lV.A.
160. See Hillman, supra note 30, at 580-81 (discussing holdings applying common law
mitigation principles to cases decided under the UCC).
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performance and enforcement. Moreover, the UCC's comment requires
that the common law act as a gap-filler in UCC interpretation, implying
that such commonly understood doctrines as mitigation govern when not
explicitly displaced by the UCC itself. Thus, holding that there is a duty
to mitigate damages in every circumstance, including in the face of a
liquidated damages clause, does not conflict with the statutory duties
created by the UCC.
V. THE (MINIMAL) PROBLEMS AND COMPLEXITIES OF REQUIRING A
DUTY TO MITIGATE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSES

While holding that there is a duty to mitigate damages despite a
liquidated damages clause resonates with the appropriate understanding
of both common law and the UCC, and constitutes sound policy, this
holding is not without its difficulties. However, these difficulties are
germane to mitigation and liquidated damages generally and do not
reflect any increased problems due to requiring the mitigation of
liquidated damages. Such complications include the complexities of
modern commercial contracts, an offer to mitigate from the breaching
party, and the problem of lost volume sellers.
A. The Complexity of Modern CommercialContractsand International
Law
Enforcement difficulties often arise due to the complexity and
specialization of modern commercial contracts, which may in turn cause
difficulties in mitigating damages.161 Many commercial contracts can
extend over long periods of time, involve multiple parties, and include
benefits that may not be "objectively quantifiable."l 62 As noted
previously, such complexities are exactly why parties formulate
liquidated damages provisions in the first place.16 3 Some contend that
such clauses may need to be viewed flexibly by the courts to protect the
"idiosyncratic bargainer['s] ... nonpecuniary values."1 64 Because the
contract is uniquely tailored to each party's individual needs, the ability
to mitigate by entering substitute transactions may be severely

161. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of ContractualObligation,69 VA. L. REV. 967, 970, 1001-02 (1983).
162. See id. at 1000. Indeed, these are reasons as to why mitigation can involve litigation.
163. See id. ("Even in markets with close substitutes, particularized clauses are important for
any atypical bargainer."); see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
164. Goetz& Scott, supra note 161, at 1001.
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decreased, and the parties may become "mutually dependen[t]" on each
other to receive the benefits from the contract. 16 5
California and Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc.166 is one
example of a complicated contract in which a court would be well
advised to dispense with a duty to mitigate the liquidated damages
clause. California and Hawaiian Sugar Company, a transporter of raw
sugar from Hawaii to California, contracted with Sun Ship, Inc. and
Halter Marine, Inc. to build an "integrated tug barge"; Sun Ship was to
build the barge, and Halter Marine was to build the tug.167 Because any
sugar stored on the ground or remaining unharvested spoils, ready and
available transportation to the California refineries was pivotal to the
business of the Sugar Company.' 6 8 The contract with Sun Ship included
a liquidated damages clause of $17,000 per day in the event Sun Ship
failed to deliver.16 9 Although Halter Marine did not deliver the tug to
Sun Ship on time, thereby preventing Sun Ship from connecting the tug
to the barge to complete the ship, the court found that the liquidated
damages clause specifically required the barge to be delivered on time,
and thus Sun Ship's failure to deliver the barge triggered the liquidated
damages clause.170 Additionally, because the damages were extremely
difficult to calculate, and the liquidated damages amount was reasonable
given the anticipated harm, the clause did not constitute a penalty.' 7'
In this case, the Sugar Company was able to mitigate its damages
by finding other available shipping.172 Costs avoided also included
transportation savings and lay-up costs. 173 However, "the exact damages
caused [to] its manifold operations by lack of the integrated tug boat
[were] . . . difficult of ascertainment." 74 Because it was impossible to
determine how much was saved by the delivery of the sugar to the
refineries and industrial customers, it was impossible to calculate actual
damages. As this contract contained numerous factors that made loss in
value, other loss, and loss avoided extremely difficult to calculate, it was

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
adoption
common
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1002.
794 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1434-35.
Id at 1435.
Id.
See id. at 1435-36, 1439.
Id. at 1436. It should be noted that the court decided this case under Pennsylvania's
of the UCC, which has identical language to the UCC itself. See id. The court uses
law to interpret these provisions. Id. at 1437.
Id. at 1436.
Id at 1438.
Id. at 1439.
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appropriate for the court to disregard mitigation in the face of a valid
liquidated damages clause. However, to reiterate, this difficulty is not
inherent in all contracts that contain liquidated damages clauses, and
such decisions to disregard mitigation should be reserved for those cases
where such calculations are nearly impossible.
In today's increasingly globalized society, many commercial
contracts have the potential to involve parties from multiple countries
and nations. As such, in the spring of 1980, the General Assembly of the
United Nations convened the Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods ("CISG").17' The CISG, unlike the UCC,
explicitly requires mitigation:
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as
are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss
of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures,
the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the
amount by which the loss should have been mitigated.176
In line with the common law and the UCC, the CISG also requires "the
observance of good faith in international trade," the corollary of which
includes mitigation in contract enforcement.' 77 As of July 1, 2008,
seventy countries, including the United States, had become parties to the
CISG. 7 1
Similar to the UCC analysis above,' 79 the CISG's emphasis on
mitigation and good faith supports a duty to mitigate damages despite a
liquidated damages clause. In fact, the case for recognizing a duty to
mitigate in the face of a liquidated damages clause is even stronger in
international law because the CISG expressly requires reasonable
attempts to mitigate loss. 8 0 Furthermore, the U.N. General Assembly,
"[r]ecognizing that a wide range of international trade contracts contain
clauses obligating a party that fails to perform an obligation under the
contract to pay an agreed sum to the other party," urged States to adopt
175. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. The CISG "governs the sale of goods between private
parties whose places of business are in different nations and whose nations are Contracting Parties
to the CISG." Andrew Babiak, Comment, Defining "Fundamental Breach" Under the United
Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
113, 113 (1992).
176. CISG, supra note 175, art. 77, at 73.
177. Id. at art. 7(1).
178. Christine E. Nicholas, Teach an Old UCC Dog New Tricks: An Overview of the U.N.
Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2008, at 39, 39.
179. See supra Part IV.
180. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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the Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due upon
Failure of Performance (the "Uniform Rules").' 8' However, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (the "U.N.
Commission") did not amend the duty to mitigate damages under Article
77 of the CISG when adopting the rules regarding agreed sums.' 8 2 As the
Uniform Rules were written and adopted only three years after the
CISG, the U.N. Commission would presumably have adopted such a
modification if it had intended to dispense with the duty to mitigate in
the face of a liquidated damages clause.' 83 Thus, parties engaging in
international commercial contracts should be aware that the general duty
to mitigate is not definitively excluded by the inclusion of a liquidated
damages clause in the contract.184
B. Are You Required to Mitigate if the Mitigation Offer Comesfrom the
BreachingParty?
Although the mitigation doctrine requires the non-breaching party
to avoid all reasonable losses upon contract breach, it is not clear if a
non-breaching party must accept reasonable offers of mitigation from
the breaching party.' 8 5 For example, would NPS have been required to
accept if Minihane had offered to pay for the remainder of the license? A
number of courts have decided that there is no duty to accept mitigation
offers from the breaching party: 86 "We doubt if any man should be
required to contract a second time with one who has without cause
breached a prior contract with him. A man's nature is such that he
almost instinctively rebels against it.,,187 A non-breaching party should
also not have to accept a substitute contract with the breaching party
when the initial contract was of a personal nature (for example, an
employment contract), when the new contract contains new or changed

181. G.A. Res. 38/135, at 270, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/135 (Dec. 19, 1983).
182. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade, Uniform Rules on Contract Clausesfor an Agreed Sum
Due Upon FailureofPerformance, annex I, U.N. Doc. A/38/17 (June 29, 1983).
183. See id.
184. However, parties do always have the option of excluding the CISG and agreeing to a
different governing law. Babiak, supra note 175, at 141.
185. See Hillman, supra note 30, at 554-55.
186. See, e.g.,Cain v. Grosshans & Petersen, Inc., 413 P.2d 98, 102 (Kan. 1966); Canadian
Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 179 N.E. 383, 385 (N.Y. 1932); Stanley Manly Boys'
Clothes, Inc. v. Hickey, 259 S.W. 160, 162 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924). But see Lawrence v. Porter,
63 F. 62, 66 (6th Cir. 1894) ("The obligation on the buyer to mitigate his loss, by reason of the
seller's refusal to carry out such a sale, is not relaxed because the delinquent seller affords the only
opportunity for such reduction of the buyer's damage.").
187. Stanley Manly Boys'Clothes, Inc., 259 S.W. at 162.
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terms, when the offer is conditioned on waiver of damages from the
breach of the original contract, and when the breaching party has already
committed a material breach. 1 88 Thus, although it may make economic
sense to accept such a new offer, courts do not typically allow the
breaching party to benefit by mandating a second contract between the
parties.1
Despite the reluctance of courts to require the non-breaching party
to deal with the breaching party for mitigation purposes, the UCC
contains a number of provisions that indicate such mitigation efforts
would be required.' 90 Many provisions of the Code require mitigation to
the extent that it is "reasonable." 91 As the reasonableness of an offer
does not depend on the identity of the offeror, it follows that the nonbreaching party should accept the breaching party's mitigation offer.1 92
For example, section 2-706(4) allows a seller to resell goods as a result
of the breach, but the buyer must be given reasonable notification of the
time and place of the resale.' 93 As section 2-706(2) only requires that the
sale be "commercially reasonable," the buyer may reasonably
repurchase the goods at the public sale. 19 4 Section 2-508(1) also allows
the seller to cure any defects in delivery if the time for performance has
not yet expired, thereby requiring the buyer to accept the seller's
mitigative efforts to cure.19 5 Under section 2-712, a buyer may, but is not
required to, make "any reasonable purchase" to mitigate damages "in
good faith." 96 Consequently, "[i]f the breaching seller offers the goods
at contract price or at the best price available and the buyer has
assurances that the seller will perform, it may only be reasonable for the
buyer to purchase from the seller." 9 7 In fact, a court in Alabama held
that the jury must decide if a buyer did not properly mitigate damages

188. See Hillman, supra note 30, at 569-70.
189. See id. at 568.
190. See supra Part IV.
191. See supranotes 140-42, 145 and accompanying text.
192. However, as previously noted, common law provisions supplement the UCC provisions.
See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. Thus, where a jurisdiction has ruled that an injured
party has no duty to accept offers to mitigate from the breaching party, it may be that the deciding
court will follow such precedent in determining what is reasonable, even when the case is governed

by the UCC.
193. See U.C.C. §2-706(4)(b) (2003); see also Hillman, supranote 30, at 581.
194. U.C.C. § 2-706(2); see Hillman, supra note 30, at 581 ("Since under Section 2-706 the
resale must be 'reasonable,' presumably seller could not arbitrarily refuse to resell to the buyer.").
195. See U.C.C. § 2-508(1). Further, the seller is allowed additional time to perform if she had
"reasonable grounds to believe" such goods would be satisfactory. Id. §2-508(2).
196. Id. § 2-712(1).
197. Hillman, supra note 30, at 583-84.
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when he purchased pipe from a third party, rather than opting to
purchase pipe at a lower cost from the breaching seller.' 98
This issue is germane to the doctrine of mitigation as a whole and
has yet to be resolved. Requiring mitigation in the face of a liquidated
damages clause does not solve this issue, but also does not add to the
complexity of determining if the non-breaching party need accept such
offers. In light of the principles discussed above, parties' expectations
are sustained by requiring mitigation in all circumstances, and parties
should expect to deal with the breaching party where the governing
jurisdiction has ruled on the issue, or where the UCC dictates that such
actions are necessary.
C. The Lost Volume Seller Problem
Another problem relating to the doctrine of mitigation is that of the
lost volume seller. A lost volume seller "is one whose willingness and
ability to supply is, as a practical matter, unlimited in comparison to the
demand for the product."l 99 Common law holds that lost volume sellers
are not required to mitigate damages because such sellers would have
been able to enter the second contract regardless of breach, and thus
cannot receive their expectation interest by simply entering a subsequent
transaction. 20 0 Thus, the second transaction is not truly a substitute of the
first, as the second transaction would have occurred regardless of
breach.20 1
Holding that there is a duty to mitigate liquidated damages clauses
leaves this doctrine intact when a party is truly a lost volume seller, and
rightfully so. Because the seller's profit cannot be recouped by entering
into a second transaction, disallowing mitigation does not discourage

198. See Owens v. Clow Corp., 491 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Hillman, supra
note 30, at 585.
199. Collins Entm't Corp. v. Coats & Coats Rental Amusement, 629 S.E.2d 635, 637 (S.C.
2006).
200. See R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678, 682 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987)
("[B]y definition, a lost volume seller cannot mitigate damages through resale. Resale does not
reduce a lost volume seller's damages because the breach has still resulted in its losing one sale and
a corresponding profit."); Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 833 A.2d 891, 904 (Conn. 2003); Collins
Entm 't Corp., 629 S.E.2d at 637. But see Ne. Vending Co. v. P.D.O., Inc., 606 A.2d 936, 938 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (rejecting lost volume seller theory and requiring such sellers to mitigate damages).
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. f (1981) ("If the injured party
could and would have entered into the subsequent contract, even if the contract had not been
broken, and could have had the benefit of both, he can be said to have 'lost volume' and the
subsequent transaction is not a substitute for the broken contract."); Farnsworth, supra note 13, at
1195-96.
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economic waste and inefficiency, and does not entitle the seller to
double profits. Additionally, failure to mitigate damages does not
evidence bad faith because the seller is simply aiming to place himself in
as good a position as if the contract had been performed in accordance
with traditional contract principles.202 However, courts must take care in
determining who qualifies as a lost volume seller. As noted, a lost
volume seller must be "unlimited" in supply. 2 03 NPS, which possesses
approximately 6000 Club seats, is not unlimited in its supply of this
level of seating. 204 For those who are truly lost volume sellers, mitigation
need not apply even in the presence of a liquidated damages clause
because the policies and reasons for encouraging mitigation are not
applicable in such cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the common law duty to mitigate damages should be
retained, even if a contract contains a liquidated damages clause. Courts
holding that there is no such duty provide little rationale for their
holdings, effectively taking the easy way out by simply dispensing with
the obligation. At the very least, there are a number of reasons why a
categorical rule holding that there is no duty to mitigate damages despite
a liquidated damages clause is undesirable. Such a broad holding allows
for less exertion by all parties: courts will not have to bother calculating
mitigation and the non-breaching party will not have to expend any
effort to avoid loss. When calculations and mitigation are simple and
unproblematic, courts promote inequity by awarding the total liquidated
damages amount without requiring even the slightest effort to mitigate.
Not only does this distort traditional damages law, but it allows the
breaching party to recover unearned profits over and above the
expectation interest while simultaneously penalizing the defendant.
Additionally, such a holding encourages waste and idleness and is
inconsistent with the doctrine of good faith. Under the rule suggested

202. See supra Part III.E.
203. Collins Entm't Corp., 629 S.E.2d at 637.
204. Stadiums of Pro Football, Gillette Stadium, http://www.stadiumsofprofootball.com/afc/
GilletteStadium.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). In fact, since the entire stadium has a maximum
capacity, NPS cannot, by definition, be a lost volume seller no matter what seat is sold. Although
the court did not rule on the issue, NPS argued in its brief that it had no duty to mitigate damages
because it was a lost volume seller. Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 5, at 31. Ironically,
although the parties did argue the lost volume seller issue, the court ruled instead that NPS had no
duty to mitigate because of the presence of a liquidated damages clause, an issue argued by neither
party. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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above, the recovery by NPS would be exactly the same. As NPS was
actively but unsuccessfully attempting to resell the licensed seats, NPS
did not have losses avoided. Actual damages were appropriately the
amount of liquidated damages specified in the contract. Thus, the "right"
result was reached via a different ruling by the court.
The analysis in this Note does not interfere with the ability of
parties to stipulate to liquidated damages clauses and in fact encourages
them to do so when the damages calculation is complex. Freedom of
contract and the preservation of the parties' interests are of utmost
importance in contract law and necessary for the efficient functioning of
society. Courts must look to protect parties' interests in avoiding
cumbersome and expensive litigation over damages and should, on a
case-by-case basis, dispense with the rule requiring mitigation where it
is warranted by complex calculations. However, it is problematic that
courts expound overarching categorical rules so as to exclude traditional
mitigation doctrine, especially where the issue is not broached or argued
by the parties. Requiring a duty to mitigate in all circumstances is a
simple, easy to follow rule. Where mitigation is successful, contractual
relations remain positive and assets are not wasted. If mitigation is not
successful, no harm is done, and the non-breaching party continues to
receive the benefit of its bargain in the full liquidated damages amount.
Additionally, if the mitigation calculation is burdensome to calculate,
then courts have the discretion to dispense with this duty on a case-bycase basis. It is no skin off the system's back to require only a
reasonable effort to mitigate-but the benefits gained, as seen above, are
enormous.
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